Bureaucratic Reshuffling and Efficiency: Do n-Competing Bureaus Determine Inefficient Results?

Bureaucratic Reshuffling and Efficiency: Do n-Competing Bureaus Determine Inefficient Results?

Blog Article

Governments often support their preferences for decentralised (centralised) bureaucracies on the grounds of efficiency considerations (production side).Here, we consider the demand side, i.e.

, whether the government perception of citizens’ demand for differentiated goods/services might increase efficiency Formula 1 box by simply reshuffling bureaucratic production activities.We represent the budgetary process—between an incumbent governing party and n-competing bureaus producing differentiated goods/services—as a simultaneous Nash-compliance game with complete information.On these grounds, we analyse—in terms of public production, players’ rents and payoffs—the effects of increasing competition (as for the number of bureaus) in the political−bureaucratic market.

Moreover, we evaluate, ceteris paribus, the effects of bureaucratic reshuffling from the point of view of society, assumed to 9% 30 VOLUME prefer those policies that approximate social efficiency by minimising bureaucratic and political rents.